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Abstract. SPARK 2014 is a modern programming language and a new
state-of-the-art tool set for development and verification of high-integrity
software. In this paper, we explore the capabilities and limitations of its
latest version in the context of building a flight stack for a high-altitude
unmanned glider. Towards that, we deliberately applied static analysis
early and continuously during implementation, to give verification the
possibility to steer the software design. In this process we have identi-
fied several limitations and pitfalls of software design and verification in
SPARK, for which we give workarounds and protective actions to avoid
them. Finally, we give design recommendations that have proven effective
for verification, and summarize our experiences with this new language.
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1 Introduction
The system under consideration is a novel kind of weather balloon which is
actively controlled, and thus requires verification to ensure it is working properly
in public airspace. As any normal weather balloon, the system climbs up to the
stratosphere (beyond an altitude of 10 km), while logging weather data such as
temperature, pressure, NO2-levels and so on. Eventually the balloon bursts, and
the sensors would be falling back to the ground with a parachute, drifting away
with prevailing wind conditions. However, our system is different from this point
onwards: the sensors are placed in a light-weight glider aircraft which is attached
to the balloon. At a defined target altitude, the glider separates itself from the
balloon, stabilizes its attitude and performs a controlled descent back to the
take-off location, thus, bringing the sensors back home. In this paper we focus
on the development and formal verification of the glider’s onboard software.
The requirements for such a system are challenging already because of the ex-
treme environmental conditions; temperatures range from 30 ◦C down to −50 ◦C,
winds may exceed 100 kph, and GPS devices may yield vastly different output in
∗The source code for this project is available at github.com/tum-ei-rcs/StratoX.
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Trento, Italy, 2017.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
7.
00
94
5v
1 
 [c
s.S
E]
  8
 Ju
n 2
01
7
those altitudes due to decreasing precision and the wind conditions. The com-
bination of those extreme values is likely to trigger corner cases in the software,
and thus should be covered by means of extensive testing or by analysis.
We use this opportunity of a safety-critical, yet hardly testable system to
explore the new state-of-the art verification tools of Ada/SPARK 2014 [7], espe-
cially to identify limitations, pitfalls and applicability in practice. To experience
this new SPARK release to its full extent, we applied a co-verification approach.
That is, we did not perform verification on a finished product, but instead in
parallel to the software development (the specific strategy is not of relevance
for this paper, but only the effect that this enabled us to identify code features
that pose challenges in verification, and find workarounds for them). The imple-
mentation could therefore be shaped by verification needs. Moreover, since the
high-altitude glider was a research project, we allowed ourselves to modify the
initial software design to ease verification when needed.
2 Verification in Ada/SPARK
SPARK 2014 is a major redesign of the original SPARK language, which was
intended for formal verification. SPARK 2014 now adopts Ada 2012 syntax,
and covers a large subset of Ada. As a result, the GNAT Ada compiler can
build an executable from SPARK 2014 source code, and even compile a program
which mixes both languages. Compared to Ada, the most important exclusions
are pointers (called access), aliasing and allocators, as well as a ban of exception
handling. As a consequence, SPARK programs first and foremost must be shown
to be free of run-time exceptions (called AoRTE - absence of run-time errors),
which constitutes the main verification task.
The SPARK language – for the rest of this paper we refer to SPARK 2014
simply as SPARK – is built on functional contracts and data flow contracts.
Subprograms (procedures and functions) can be annotated with pre- and post-
conditions, as well as with data dependencies. GNATprove, the (only) static
analyzer for SPARK 2014, aims to prove subprograms in a modular way, by an-
alyzing each of them individually. The effects of callees are summarized by their
post-condition when the calling subprogram is analyzed, and the precondition
of the callee is imposing a proof obligation on the caller, i.e., the need to verify
that the caller respects the callee’s precondition. Further proof obligations arise
from each language-defined check that is executed on the target, such as overflow
checks, index checks, and so on. If all proofs are successful, then the program
is working according to its contracts and no exceptions will be raised during
execution, i.e., AoRTE is established.
Internally, GNATprove [7] builds on the Why3 platform [6], which performs
deductive verification on the proof obligations to generate verification conditions
(VCs), and then passes them to a theorem solver of user’s choice, e.g., cvc4, alt-
ergo or z3. Note that there exists also a tool for abstract interpretation, which
is, however, not discussed here.
2.1 The GNAT Dimensionality Checking System
We also want to introduce a feature that is not part of the SPARK language
itself, but an implementation-defined extension of the GNAT compiler, and thus
available for SPARK programs. Since Ada 2012, the GNAT compiler offers a di-
mension system for numeric types through implementation-defined aspects [9].
The dimension system can consist of up to seven base dimensions, and physi-
cal quantities are declared as subtypes, annotated with the exponents of each
dimension. Expressions using such variables are statically analyzed by the com-
piler for their dimensional consistency. Furthermore, the dimensioned variables
contribute to readability and documentation of the code. Inconsistencies such as
the following are found (dividend and divisor are switched in the calculation of
rate):
1 angle : Angle_Type := 20.0 * Degree;
2 dt : Time_Type := 100.0 * Milli * Second;
3 rate : Angular_Velocity_Type := dt / angle; -- compiler error
Note that scaling prefixes like Milli can be used, and that common conversions,
such as between Degree and Radian in line 1, can be governed in a similar way.
In our project, we specified a unit system with the dimensions length, mass,
time, temperature, current, and angle. Adding angle as dimension provides better
protection against assignments of dimensionless types, as proposed in [11].
3 Initial System Design & Verification Goals
Target Hardware. We have chosen the “Pixhawk” autopilot [8]. It comprises
two ARM processors; one Cortex-M4F (STM32F427) acting as flight control
computer, and one Cortex-M3 co-processor handling the servo outputs. We im-
plemented our flight stack on the Cortex-M4 from the ground up, thus completely
replacing the original PX4/NuttX firmware that is installed when shipped.
Board Support, Hardware Abstraction Layer & Run-Time System.
We are hiding the specific target from the application layer by means of a board
support package (not to be confused with an Ada package). This package contains
an hardware abstraction layer (HAL) and a run-time system (RTS). The RTS
is implementing basic functionality such as tasking and memory management.
The HAL is our extension of AdaCore’s Drivers Library [1], and the RTS is our
port of the Ada RTS for the STM32F409 target. Specifically, we have ported
the Ravenscar Small Footprint variant [3], which restricts Ada’s and SPARK’s
tasking facilities to a deterministic and analyzable subset, but meanwhile forbids
exception handling, which anyway is not permitted in SPARK.
Separating Tasks by Criticality has been one goal, since multi-threading
is supported in SPARK. In particular, 1. termination of low-critical tasks must
not cause termination of high-critical tasks, 2. higher-criticality tasks must not be
blocked by lower-critical tasks and, 3. adverse effects such as deadlocks, priority
inversion and race condition must not occur. We partitioned our glider software
into two tasks (further concurrency arises from interrupt service routines):
1. The Flight-Critical Task includes all execution flows required to keep the
glider in a controlled and navigating flight, thus including sensor reads and
actuator writes. It is time-critical for control reasons. High-criticality.
2. The Mission-Critical Task includes all execution flows that are of relevance
for recording and logging of weather data to an SD card. Low-priority task,
only allowed to run when the flight-critical task is idle. Low-criticality.
The latter task requires localization data from the former one, to annotate the
recorded weather data before writing it to the SD card. Additionally, it takes
over the role of a flight logger, saving data from the flight-critical task that might
be of interest for a post-flight analysis. The interface between these two tasks
would therefore be a protected object with a message queue that must be able
to hold different types of messages.
Verification Goals. First and foremost, AoRTE shall be established for all
SPARK parts, since exceptions would result in task termination. Additionally,
the application shall make use of as many contracts and checks as possible, and
perform all of its computations using dimension-checked types. Last but not
least, a few functional high-level requirements related to the homing function-
ality have been encoded in contracts. Overall, the focus of verification was the
application, not the BSP. The BSP has been written in SPARK only as far as
necessary to support proofs in the application. The rationale was that the RTS
was assumed to be well tested, and the HAL was expected to be hardly verifiable
due to direct hardware access involving pointers and restricted types.
4 Problems and Workarounds
In this section, we describe the perils and difficulties that we identified during
verification of SPARK programs. We use the following nomenclature:
– False Positive denotes a failing check (failed VC) in static analysis which
would not fail in any execution on the target, i.e., a false alarm.
– False Negative denotes a successful check (discharged VC) in static analysis
which would fail in at least one execution on the target, i.e., a missed failure.
4.1 How to Miss Errors
There are a few situations in which static analysis can miss run-time exceptions,
which in a SPARK program inevitably ends in abnormal program termination.
Before we show these unwanted situations, we have to point out one impor-
tant property of a deductive verification approach: Proofs build on each other.
Consider the following example (results of static analysis given in comments):
1 a := X / Z; -- medium: division check might fail
2 b := Y / Z; -- info: division check proved
The analyzer reports that the check in line 2 cannot fail, although it suffers from
the same defect as line 1. However, when the run-time check at line 1 fails, then
line 2 cannot be reached with the offending value of Z, therefore line 2 is not a
False Negative, unless exceptions have been wrongfully disabled.
Mistake 1: Suppressing False Positives. When a developer comes to the
conclusion that the analyzer has generated a False Positive (e.g., due to insuf-
ficient knowledge on something that is relevant for a proof), then it might be
justified to suppress the failing property. However, we experienced cases where
this has generated False Negatives which where hiding (critical) failures. Con-
sider the following code related to the GPS:
1 function toInt32 (b : Byte_Array) return Int_32 with Pre => b’Length = 4;
2 procedure Read_From_Device (d : out Byte_Array) is begin
3 d := (others => 0); -- False Positive
4 pragma Annotate (GNATprove , False_Positive , "length check might fail",
...);
5 end Read_From_Device;
6
7 procedure Poll_GPS is
8 buf : Byte_Array (0..91) := (others => 0);
9 alt_mm : Int_32;
10 begin
11 Read_From_Device (buf);
12 alt_mm := toInt32(buf (60..64)); -- False Negative , guaranteed exception
13 end Poll_GPS;
Static analysis found that the initialization of the array d in line 3 could fail, but
this is not possible in this context, and thus a False Positive1. The developer was
therefore suppressing this warning with an annotation pragma. However, because
proofs build on each other, a severe defect in line 12 was missed. The array slice
has an off-by-one error which guaranteed failing the precondition check of toInt32.
The reason for this False Negative is that everything after the initialization of
d became virtually unreachable and that all following VCs consequently have
been discharged. In general, a False Positive may exclude some or all execution
paths for its following statements, and thus hide (critical) failure. We therefore
recommend to avoid suppressing False Positives, and either leave them visible
for the developer as warning signs, or even better, rewrite the code in a prover-
friendly manner following the tips in Section 5.1.
Mistake 2: Inconsistent Contracts. Function contracts act as barriers for
propagating proof results (besides inlined functions), that is, the result of a VC
in one subprogram cannot affect the result of another in a different subprogram.
However, these barriers can be broken when function contracts are inconsistent,
producing False Negatives by our definition. One way to obtain inconsistent
contracts, is writing a postcondition which itself contains a failing VC (line 2):
1 function f1 (X : Integer) return Integer
2 with Post => f1’Result = X + 1 is -- overflow check might fail
3 begin
4 return X;
5 end f1;
6
7 procedure Caller is
8 X : Integer := Integer ’Last;
9 begin
10 X := X + 1; -- overflow check proved.
11 X := f1(X);
12 end Caller;
1This particular case has been fixed in recent versions of GNATprove.
Clearly, an overflow must happen at line 10, resulting in an exception. The
analyzer, however, proves absence of overflows in Caller. The reason is that in
the Why3 backend, the postcondition of f1 is used as an axiom in the analysis
of Caller. The resulting theory for Caller is an inconsistent axiom set, from which
(principle of explosion) anything can be proven, including that false VCs are true.
In such circumstances, the solver may also produce a spurious counterexample.
In the example above, the developer gets a warning for the inconsistent post-
condition and can correct for it, thus keep barriers intact and ensure that the
proofs in the caller are not influenced. However, if we change line 4 to return X+1,
then the failing VC is now indicated in the body of f1, and – since the proofs
build on each other – the postcondition is verified and a defect easily missed.
Therefore, failing VCs within callees may also refute proofs in the caller (in con-
trast to execution semantics) and have to be taken into account. Indeed, the
textual report of GNATprove (with flag --assumptions) indicates that AoRTE
in Caller depends on both the body and the postcondition of f1, and therefore
the reports have to be studied with great care to judge the verification output.
Finally, note that the same principle applies for assertions and loop invariants.
Mistake 3: Forgetting the RTS. Despite proven AoRTE, one procedure
which rotates the frame of reference of the gyroscope measurements was sporad-
ically triggering an exception after a floating-point multiplication. The situation
was eventually captured in the debugger as follows:
1 -- angle = 0.00429 , vector (Z) = -2.023e-38
2 result(Y) := Sin (angle) * vector(Z);
3 -- result(Y) = -8.68468736e-41 => Exception
Variable result was holding a subnormal floating-point number, roughly speak-
ing, an “underflow”. GNATprove models floating-point computations according
to IEEE-754, which requires support for subnormals on the target processor.
Our processor’s FPU indeed implements subnormals, but the RTS, part of which
describes floating-point capabilities of the target processor, was incorrectly in-
dicating the opposite2. As a result, the language-defined float validity check
occasionally failed (in our case when the glider was resting level and motionless
at the ground for a longer period of time). Therefore, the RTS must be care-
fully configured and checked manually for discrepancies, otherwise proofs can be
refuted since static analysis works with an incorrect premise.
Mistake 4: Bad Patterns. Saturation may seem like an effective workaround
to ensure overflows, index checks and so on cannot fail, but it usually hides bigger
flaws. Consider the following example, also from the GPS protocol parser:
1 subtype Lat_Type is Angle_Type range -90.0 * Degree .. 90.0 * Degree;
2 Lat : Lat_Type := Dim_Type (toInt32 (data_rx (28..31))) * 1.0e-7 * Degree;
The four raw bytes in data_rx come from the GPS device and represent a scaled
float, which could in principle carry a value exceeding the latitude range of
[−90, 90] Degree. To protect against this sort of error, it is tempting to implement
a function (even a generic) of the form if X > Lat_Type’Last then X := Lat_Type’Last
else... that limits the value to the available range, and apply it to all places
2This also has been fixed in recent versions of the embedded ARM RTS.
where checks could be failing. However, we found that almost every case where
saturation was applied, was masking a boundary case that needs to be addressed.
In this example, we needed handling for a GPS that yields faulty values. In
general, such cases usually indicate a missing software requirement.
4.2 Design Limitations
We now describe some cases where the current version of the SPARK 2014
language – not the static analysis tool – imposes limitations.
Access types (pointers) are forbidden in SPARK, however, low-level drivers
heavily rely on them. One workaround is to hide those types in a package body
that is not in SPARK, and only provide a SPARK specification. Naturally, the
body cannot be verified, but at least its subprograms can be called from SPARK
subprograms. Sometimes it is not possible to hide access types, in particular
when packages use them as interface between each other. This is the case for our
SD card driver, which is interfaced by an implementation of the FAT filesystem
through access types. Both are separate packages, but the former one exports
restricted types and access types which are used by the FAT package, thus requir-
ing that wide parts of the FAT package are written in Ada instead of SPARK.
As a consequence, access types are sometimes demanding to form larger
monolithic packages, here to combine SD card driver and FAT filesystem into
one (possibly nested) package.
Polymorphism is available in SPARK, but its use is limited as a result of the
access type restriction. Our message queue between flight-critical and mission-
critical task was planned to hold messages of a polymorphic type. However,
without access types the only option to handover messages would be to take a
deep copy and store it in the queue. However, the queue itself is realized with
an array and can hold only objects of the same type. This means a copy would
also be an upcast to the base type. This, in turn, would loose the components
specific to the derived type, and therefore render polymorphism useless. As a
workaround, we used mutable variant records.
Interfaces. Closely related to polymorphism, we intended to implement sen-
sors as polymorphic types. That is, specify an abstract sensor interface that must
be overridden by each sensor implementation. Towards that, we declared an ab-
stract tagged type with abstract primitive methods denoting the interface that
a specific sensor must implement. However, when we override the method for a
sensor implementation, such as the IMU, SPARK requires specifying the global
dependencies of the overriding IMU implementation as class-wide global depen-
dencies of the abstract method (SPARK RM 6.1.6). This happens even without
an explicit Global aspect. As workaround, we decided to avoid polymorphism
and used simple inheritance without overriding methods.
Dimensioned Types. Using the GNAT dimensionality checking system in
SPARK, had revealed two missing features. Firstly, in the current stable ver-
sion of the GNAT compiler, it is not possible to specify general operations on
dimensioned types that are resolved to specific dimensions during compilation.
For example, we could not write a generic time integrator function for the PID
controller that multiplies any dimensioned type with a time value and returns
the corresponding unit type. Therefore, we reverted to dimensionless and un-
constrained floats within the generic PID controller implementation. Secondly,
it is not possible to declare vectors and matrices with mixed subtypes, which
would be necessary to retain the dimensionality information throughout vector
calculations (e.g., in the Kalman Filter). As a consequence, we either have split
vectors into their components, or reverted to dimensionless and unconstrained
floats. As a result of these workarounds, numerous overflow checks related to
PID control and Kalman Filter could not be proven (which explains more than
70 % of our failed floating-point VCs).
4.3 Solver Weaknesses
We now summarize some frequent problems introduced by the current state of
the tooling.
The ’Position attribute of a record allows evaluating the position of a com-
ponent in that record. However, GNATprove has no precise information about
this position, and therefore proofs building on that might fail.
Another feature that is used in driver code, are unions, which provide differ-
ent views on the same data. GNATprove does not know about the overlay and
may generate False Positives for initialization, as well as for proofs which build
on the relation between views.
We had several False Positives related to possibly uninitialized variables.
SPARK follows a strict data initialization policy. Every (strict) output of a sub-
program must be initialized. In the current version, GNATprove only considers
initialization of arrays as complete when done in a single statement. This gener-
ates warnings when an array is initialized in multiple steps, e.g., through loops,
which we have suppressed.
5 Results
In general, verification of SPARK 2014 programs is accessible and mostly auto-
matic. Figure 1 shows the results of our launch release. As it can be seen, we
could not prove all properties during the time of this project (three months).
The non-proven checks have largely been identified as “fixable”, following our
design recommendations given below.
The complexity of our flight stack and verification progress are summarized
in Table 1. It can be seen that our focus on the application part is reflected in the
SPARK coverage that we have achieved (82 % of all bodies in SPARK, and even
99 % of all specifications), but also that considerably more work has to be done
for the BSP (currently only verified by testing). In particular, the HAL (off-chip
device drivers, bus configuration, etc.) is the largest part and thus needs a higher
SPARK coverage. However, we should add that 43 % of the HAL is consisting
of specifications generated from CMSIS-SVD files, which do not contain any
subprograms, but only definitions of peripheral addresses and record definitions
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Fig. 1: Statistics on Verification Conditions (VCs) by type.
Table 1: Metrics and verification statistics of our Flight Stack.
Board Support Package
Metric Application HAL RTS All
lines of code (GNATmetric) 6,750 32,903 15,769 55,422
number of packages 49 100 121 270
cyclomatic complexity 2.03 2.67 2.64 2.53
SPARK body/spec 81.9/99.4 % 15.5/23.5 % 8.6/11.8 % 30.0/38.5 %
number of VCs 3,214 765 2 3,981
VCs proven 88.1 % 92.5 % 100 % 88.8 %
analysis timea – – – 19 min
aIntel Xeon E5-2680 Octa-Core with 16 GB RAM, timeout=120 s, steps=inf.
to access them, and therefore mostly cannot be covered in SPARK. Last but not
least, a completely verified RTS would be desirable, as well.
Floats are expensive. Statistically, we have spent most of the analysis time
(65 %) for proving absence of floating-point overflows, although these amount to
only 21 % of all VCs. This is because discharging such VCs is in average one
magnitude slower than discharging most other VC types. In particular, one has
to allow a high step limit (roughly the number of decisions a solver may take, e.g.,
deciding on a literal) and a high timeout. Note that at some point an increase
of either of them does not improve the result anymore.
Multi-Threading could be proven to follow our goals. By using the Raven-
scar RTS, our goals related to deadlock, priority inversion and blocking, hold
true by design. Several race conditions and non-thread-safe subprograms have
been identified by GNATprove, which otherwise would have refuted task sep-
aration. To ensure that termination of low-criticality tasks cannot terminate
the flight-critical task, we provided a custom implementation for GNAT’s last
chance handler (outside of the SPARK language and therefore not being ana-
lyzed) which reads the priority of the failing task and acts accordingly: If the
priority is lower than that of the flight-critical task (i.e., the mission-critical task
had an exception), then we prevent a system reset by sending the low-priority
task into an infinite null loop (thus keeping it busy executing nops, and keeping
the flight-critical task alive). If the flight-critical task is failing, then our handler
allows a system reset. Multi-threading is therefore easy to implement, poses no
verification problems, and can effectively separate tasks by their criticality.
High-Level Behavioral Contracts related to the homing functionality
could be expressed and proven with the help of ghost functions, although this is
beyond the main purpose of SPARK contracts. For example, we could prove the
overall behavior in case of loosing the GPS fix, or missing home coordinates.
5.1 Design Recommendations
The following constructs and strategies have been found amenable to verification:
1. Split long expressions into multiple statements → discharges more VCs.
2. Limit ranges of data types, especially floats → better analysis of overflows.
3. Avoid saturation → uncovers missing error handling and requirements.
4. Avoid interfaces → annotations for data flows break concept of abstraction.
5. Emulate polymorphic objects that must be copied with mutable variant
records.
6. Separation of tasks by criticality using a custom last chance handler →
abnormal termination of a low-criticality task does not cause termination of
high-criticality tasks.
6 Related Work
Only a small number of experience reports about SPARK 2014 have been pub-
lished before. A look back at (old) SPARK’s history and its success, as well
as an initial picture of SPARK 2014 is given by Chapman and Schanda in [4].
We can report that the mentioned difficulties with floating-point numbers are
solved in SPARK 2014, and that the goal to make verification more accessible,
has been reached. A small case study with SPARK 2014 is presented in [10], but
at that point multi-threading (Ravenscar) was not yet supported, and floating
point numbers have been skipped in the proof. We can add to the conclusion
given there, that both are easily verified in “real-world” code, although float
proofs require more (computational and mental) effort. Larger case studies are
summarized by Dross et al. in [5], with whom we share the opinion of minor
usability issues, and that some small amount of developer training is required.
Finally, SPARK 2014 with Ravenscar has recently been announced to be used
in the Lunar IceCube [2] satellite, a successor of the successful CubeSat project
that was implemented in SPARK 2005. It will be a message-centric software, con-
ceptually similar to NASA’s cFE/CFS, but fully verified and striving to become
an open source platform for spacecraft software. In contrast to all the above
publications, this paper is not focused on the application or case studies, but
pointing out typical sources of errors in SPARK programs, which a developer
has to know in order to get correct verification results.
7 Conclusion
Although the verification of SPARK 2014 programs is very close to execution
semantics and therefore mostly intuitive, we believe that developers still need
some basic training to avoid common mistakes as described in this paper, which
otherwise could lead to a false confidence in the software being developed. Over-
all, the language forces developers to address boundary cases of a system explic-
itly, which eventually helps understanding the system better, and usually reveals
missing requirements for boundary cases. As a downside, SPARK 2014 programs
are often longer than (approximately) equivalent Ada programs, since in the lat-
ter case a general exception handler can be installed to handle all pathological
cases at once, without differentiating them. Furthermore, static analysis is ready
to replace unit tests, but integration tests have still been found necessary.
Regarding the shortcomings of the GNAT dimensionality system, we can
report that as a consequence of our experiments, a solution for generic operations
on dimensioned has been found and will be part of future GNAT releases.
Our remaining criticism to SPARK 2014 and its tools is as follows: next to
some minor tooling enhancements to avoid the mistakes mentioned earlier and
adding some more knowledge to the analyzer, it is necessary to support object-
oriented features in a better way. All in all, SPARK 2014 raises the bar for formal
verification and its tools, but developers still have to be aware of limitations.
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